The purposes of this paper are to clarify the roles and characteristics of sogo shosha investment and to explore the locations of their economic activities in Canada. Japanese direct foreign investment (DFI) in Canada has been relatively moderate in size while still significant in its impact. Since mature Japanese manufacturers, financial institutions and real estate companies made large investments during the 1980's, the proportion of sogo shosha investment in the total Japanese investment in Canada declined relatively. The expansion and diversifica tion of Japanese DFI in Canada in the last decade stemmed from the changes in investment climate of the host country and the appreciation of yen . Sogo shosha, or the nine largest Japanese general trading companies, have been the chief promoters of Japanese trade and major vehicles for carrying out Japanese overseas investment during the postwar period.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently Japanese direct foreign investment. (DFI) has drawn the attention of much of the world. Japanese manufacturers and financiers are major contributors to that huge investment. Thus, investment made by sogo shosha, or the nine largest Japanese general trading com panies, has been overshadowed.
Despite the relatively small amount of sogo shosha in vestment, this paper attempts to reveal the significance of that sogo shosha investment as an "archetypical" form of postwar Japanese overseas investment. Canada proves to be an interesting host country since the Canadian economy features a "rich, industrialized, [and] underdeveloped economy" (LEVITT, 1970, p. 127) .
With the rapid increase in Japanese invest ment in Canada, the number of excellent papers on this topic has grown. WRIGHT (1984 and 1989) , RUGMAN (1990) and EDGINGTON (1990b) portray overall Japanese direct investment in Canada. MITsuHAsHI (1990) discusses Japanese investment in conjunction with the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement. HAWKINS and HAY (1986) and WRIGHT and PAULI (1987) focus on Japan's role in the financial sector. This paper focuses on the crucial roles of sogo shosha's investment and the locations of their economic activities1).
The paper first examines the characteristics of postwar Japanese direct foreign investment in Canada with regard to quantity and sector2). Then, special features of logo shosha invest ment are elucidated within the context of post war Japanese economic development.
Next, sogo shosha investment in Canada is scrutinized to evaluate the roles and characteristics of their investment. Finally, the locations of sogo shosha offices are delineated from the perspective of the different economic roles of Canada's metro politan areas.
II. JAPANESE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA
Direct foreign investment is the acquisition of foreign securities by individuals or institu tions with control over, or participation in, the management of foreign operations. DFI is dis tinguished from indirect foreign investment, or portfolio investment, in which individuals or institutions acquire the stocks or bonds of for eign governments or companies. The purpose of portfolio investment is capital gain without managing operations.
Technically, this paper adopts the definition of DFI used by the Japanese Government. The Foreign Exchange Control Law in Japan, amended in December, 19803~, defines direct for eign investment as 10% (25% before the amendment), or more, of equity acquisition in foreign operations and loans in those corpora tions. The 1980 amendment excludes the pur chase of real estate, and it is kept statistically separate from investment in the real estate in dustry. It should be noted that Japanese DFI figures include all investment proposals authorized4~ by the Ministry of Finance as well as withdrawn projects.
Direct foreign investment is accompanied not only by capital flows but also by the transfer of technology and managerial resources. With various degrees of ownership, foreign opera tions may be established by the take-over of existing local firms or as new ventures.
Japanese direct foreign investment should be looked at from both Canadian and Japanese viewpoints. According to Statistics Canada, direct foreign investment in Canada amounted to Canadian $126 billion at the end of 1990 (Statistics Canada, 1991, p. 15) . The largest in vestor was the United States, and its invest ment was C$ 79 billion, consisting of 62% of all foreign direct investment in Canada. Japanese direct investment was C$ 5 billion, which was some 4% of the total value of DFI in. Canada in 1990 (Ibid.) .
Based on Japanese government data, the ac cumulated amount of Japanese DFI in Canada was US$ 5,656 million5) at the end of the fiscal year 19906), comprising only 1.8% of the total Japanese DFI in the world. This presents a stark contrast to Japanese DFI in the United States, which absorbed 42.0% of the total Japanese overseas investment (Ministry of Finance, 1991, p. 26) .
Both data sets indicate that Japanese DFI in Canada has been relatively small for both the host and the home country in terms of quantity. Nevertheless, both data sources reveal that Jap anese direct investment in Canada is rapidly growing. Indeed, Japanese DFI in Canada in creased from C$168 million in 1984 to C$1 billion in 1989 (Statistics Canada, 1991, p. 60) . Correspondingly, the annual flows of Japanese DFI into Canada expanded from $184 million to $1.3 billion during the same period (Ministry of Finance, 1991, pp. 62-63) .
Since the Japanese government data provide more current and more detailed information regarding industrial sectors than the Canadian government sources, the following analyses are based on the Japanese data. Table 1 shows the amounts and sectors of Japanese investment in Canada since 1951. It reveals a large amount of investment as well as changes in investment sectors in the 1980's. Specifically, from 1980 to 1990 the total of all Japanese DFI in Canada amounted to $4,848, which consisted of 85.7% of the total accumulated investment amount during the last four decades. These figures en dorse the view of sharply increasing Japanese investment in Canada. Finance, ed., Zaisei Kenkyu Tokei Geppo No. 476, 1991, pp. 62-63. Prior to 1980, investment was focused in the three major sectors: manufacturing (36.6%), es pecially lumber and pulp (17.0%); mining (29.8%); and commerce (18.8%). These indicate that Japanese prime interests have been in se curing the supply of Canadian forest and miner al resources for Japan. Equally important, the establishment of commercial networks has had great weight due to the promotion of the bilat eral trade between Japan and Canada.
Since 1980 there have been new develop ments in investment sectors. The manufactur ing industry continued to capture the lion's share of investment of $2,282 million, account ing for 47.1% of the total Japanese investment between 1980 and 1990. In the manufacturing sector, the lumber and pulp industry remained the largest recipient (23.0%). A new phenome non was the diversification of investment to assembly type manufacturing and high tech industries: transportation equipment (9.7%), electrical equipment (3.2%), and ordinary ma chinery (2.9%). Each of these three industries received over 90.0% of its total investment within the last decade.
Among the non-manufacturing industries, three new sectors attracted Japanese invest ment in addition to traditional investment con centrations in mining and commerce. The real estate industry, finance and insurance, and ser vices received 13.4%, 11.9%, and 10.5% of the total Japanese investment, respectively.
Since the Japanese government data are not broken down by geographical location, data in Shukan Toyo Keizai are often used as a surro gate. BLAIN and NORCLIFFE (1988) During the 1980's the geographical pattern of investment concentration has been slightly modified due to the changes in investment amount and sector. With the growth of invest ment in the manufacturing industry such as automobiles and electronics and in the financial and service industries, Ontario has increased in importance as the locus of Japanese investment. Considering the fact that the former industry requires diverse and supportive suppliers and the latter large markets, Ontario's supremacy in these regards is easily explained.
The changes in investment amount and sector in the 1980's, which in turn were reflect ed in location, stem largely from four major factors. First, revisions of the Canadian Bank. Act, effective January 1981, contributed to the increase in Japanese investment in the financial sector. Prior to 1981, the presence of foreign banks in Canada was restricted to representa tive offices, which could neither accept deposits nor make loans. After the revisions, a limited number of foreign banks are permitted to open full-service branches in Canada8~ (WRIGHT, 1984, pp. 64 and 66) . Second, the Japanese yen has appreciated against the U.S. In order to understand sogo shosha's invest ment activities, their functions and organiza tional structure are summarized here. The key functions of sogo shosha are trade, information collection and financial services. Organization ally, they are situated at the core of keiretsu, or industrial groups, along with their main banks. Their major functions and position at the orga nizational structure have enabled sogo shosha to develop the organizer/coordinator role, which is crucial in overseas ventures. Sogo shosha organize and coordinate consortia of companies within their affiliated keiretsu group, or with other keiretsu groups (YOUNG, 1979 , TSURUMI, 1984 , KOJIMA and OzAWA, 1984 , and KURIHARA, 1991 .
Sogo shosha have concentrated their overseas investment in three major sectors; commerce, natural resource development and manufactur ing. Since sogo shosha's core activity is trade, which includes foreign, domestic and offshore trade, their largest investment was in com merce. As of March 1988, 800 billion yen, namely 44% of the total nine sogo shosha's over seas direct investment, was directed to com merce (Nihon Boeki-kai,1990, p. 9) . Investment in commerce took place in the form of sogo shosha's wholly-owned trading subsidiaries and their marketing companies.
As early as in the 1950's, sogo shosha embark ed in overseas investment to establish their branches and wholly-owned subsidiaries to build their worldwide commercial networks. These overseas subsidiaries are crucial for their trading activities. Even though they are inde pendent companies in principle, they are close ly linked to their parent companies in Japan for all facets of business transactions. However, the degree of subsidiaries' autonomy is different in different countries. According to EDGINGTON (1990a) , the essential function of an Australian subsidiary was a go-between for the local sup pliers and the parent company and its custom ers in Japan, but the Mitsubishi American subsidiary became a more independent orga nization. This contrast stemmed from different roles. The former subsidiary supplied Austra lian raw materials for the world markets, while the latter was a net importer of Japanese prod ucts (pp. 106-108) .
In addition to trading subsidiaries, invest ment in commerce has resulted in the creation of marketing companies. Some marketing com panies are sogo shosha's wholly-owned special ized subsidiaries such as cotton companies. Some marketing companies are joint ventures between sogo shosha and Japanese manufactur ers in order to sell their products. Although the "departure -from-traders" phenomenon has ap peared, there are still many manufacturers who depend on sogo shosha to market their products due to the superb information collection ability (KURIHARA, 1991, pp. 157-158) .
Until the early 1970's Japanese DFI in manu facturing and resource development projects were joint ventures in which sogo shosha were often included as inseparable partners. Accord ing to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, trading companies were involved in 81 out of 165 development-and-import projects undertaken by the Japanese (WAKASUGI, 1973, p. 233) . Under the development-and-import for mula, capital, technology and equipment are furnished to foreign countries with Japan re ceiving natural resources in return.
The last two decades have seen sogo shosha's function persist as vital organizer in natural resource development projects. Sogo shosha often take minority equity shares with long term purchasing contracts, for their major pur poses are to secure supplies of imports to Japan and to reduce external vulnerability (Hoop and YOUNG, 1979, p. 68) . Since natural resource de velopment projects require a huge amount of capital, the minority equity share position makes it possible for sogo shosha to participate in many projects and to reduce their business risks.
With the sharp increase in labor cost in Japan during the 1960's, labor-intensive manufactur ing industries shifted their locations from Japan to developing countries which supplied cheap labor. Since these manufacturers possess neither huge capital, nor advanced technology, or managerial resources, sogo shosha were indis pensable for their manufacturing operations. These joint ventures often took a characteristic form, or a "troika style," that is, involving a concerned Japanese company, a trading firm, and a local business (YOSHIHARA,1981, p. 70) . In this scheme, the Japanese manufacturer and the trading company most likely belong to the same keiretsu group. The objectives of sogo shosha's investment in this case are the expan sion of their trade volume and the strengthen ing of their commercial ties with manufactur ers.
Sogo shosha's involvement in manufacturing joint ventures continued after more mature Japanese manufacturers commenced DFI in the 1970's. Since Japanese electrical and automo tive industries have made large investments, sogo shosha's DFI in manufacturing have become relatively smaller. Still, sogo shosha ac tively participate in manufacturing joint ven tures in developed countries as well as in devel oping countries.
With sogo shosha's participation, Japanese DFI took place in both resource-oriented invest ment and labor-intensive investment which are regarded as "trade-oriented" by Kojima. This type of investment is made in areas where the home country is losing and a host country is gaining a comparative advantage. Consequent ly, it promotes trade between the two countries (KoJIMA, 1977, pp. 75-91) . Indeed, DFI by sogo shosha is distinguished from DFI by mature Japanese manufacturers and financiers whose investment is more market-oriented. Thus, sogo shosha's DFI is considered archetypical Japa nese DFI.
In sum, sogo shosha's overseas direct invest ment is characterized by the establishment of wholly-owned trading subsidiaries, and joint ventures in manufacturing and natural re source development projects with minority equity shares and long-term purchasing con tracts. As we have seen business partners are often affiliated companies within the same kei retsu group. Because of these characteristics, sogo shosha will continue to be a catalyst in drawing more Japanese DFI to host countries. The amount of sogo shosha investment is analo gous to the tip of an iceberg, and their leverage is enormous.
IV. DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
CANADA BY SOGO SHOSHA
The presence of sogo shosha in Canada took place as early as in the 1950's. Direct foreign investment by sogo shosha has been intertwined with their trading activities. Therefore, the characteristics of sogo shosha investment in Canada are discussed focusing on the three major sectors: commerce, natural resource de velopment and manufacturing. Sogo shosha's vital investment in commerce, as noted above, aims to establish wholly-owned trading subsidiaries. The initial presence of sogo shosha in Canada was as branch offices or offices11) of either their parent companies or American subsidiaries. These offices were lo cated in the three major metropolises, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, in the mid-1950's ( Figure la) .
Sogo shosha eventually set up their own separate Canadian subsidiaries. Among the nine trading companies, the present Mitsui Canada was the first trading subsidiary in the postwar period, and was established in 1956 by Daiichi Bussan, from which the present Mitsui12) emerged (Japan Business History Insti tute, 1977, appendices p. 24). Mitsui remains the largest sogo shosha in Canada in terms of its capital and sales. In 1990 the sales of Mitsui were C$ 2,680 million, almost twice as large as the second largest sales of Mitsubishi (Table 2) . Nichimen Canada and Tomen Canada were founded as recently as in 1974 (Shukan Toyo Keizai, 1992, pp. 734 and 736) . Present paid-up capital of the nine trading subsidiaries amounts to C$ 96.56 million, consisting of some 23% of the total sogo shosha investment in Canada (ap proximately C$ 420 million)13)
Despite the independence of Canadian sogo shosha, they are closely linked to American trading subsidiaries as well as to their parent companies in Japan. Their positions are often subject to the American counterparts. Some trading companies installed a "General Man ager for North America" who takes charge of all North American operations14). "The General Manager" is the president of the American sub sidiary while he wears another hat as chairman of the Canadian subsidiary.
Although some companies have abolished this system, Maru beni still practices it15).
This continental subordination is ascribed to three major factors. First, the Canadian market is much smaller than the American one. Given that Canadian purchasing power per capita is almost equivalent to the American level, the Canadian economy (US$ 529 billion in 1989) is one-tenth the American economy (US $ 5,201 billion) in terms of Gross National Product (M0RIM0T0, p. 11).
Second, the geographical distribution of Ca nadian population is heavily concentrated in two central provinces. Ontario and Quebec pos sessed some 62% of the total Canadian popula tion in 1991 (Statistics Canada, 1992a, p. 6.94 (Marubeni, 1984, p. 67) . At the end of 1991 the capital of DMI was C$12 million, owned by Marubeni (50%) and Daishowa Paper (50%) (Shukan Toyo Keizai, 1992, p. 733) .
With the diversification of Japanese invest ment, sogo shosha's investment in manufactur ing also expanded from the resource-oriented industries, such as pulp, to the assembly-type and high tech industries. lated to the functions of a city, the economic well-being in the area20), and the particular and contrasting needs of the Japanese companies. In 1954 Tomen and Gosho, one of the prede cessors of present Kanematsu, commenced opening their offices in Montreal. These early offices belonged to the parent company of Gosho (Kanematsu, 1990, p. 328) 21) and Tomen's American trading subsidiary (Tomen, 1991b, p. 510) (Figure la) . The two offices were upgraded to branches in the later 1950's.
Montreal was the largest metropolitan center in Canada at that time (Table 3 ). In addition to the city's large market, its proximity to the United States and the developed clothing indus try in that area induced the opening up of Mon treal offices of sogo shosha, since both Tomen and Gosho started as cotton traders, and tex tiles remained the most important components of their trade.
As previously described, Mitsui first estab lished a wholly-owned trading subsidiary in Canada in 1956. Next was the present Nissho Iwai in 1959. Their head offices22) were located in Toronto, which was then the second largest metropolis in Canada (Table 3 ). In both Montre al and Toronto three additional sogo shosha also opened their offices in each center.
The third largest city, Vancouver, has been a strategic point for the traders. Because Vancou ver is a gateway port to the Pacific Ocean and a break-of-bulk point, through which most trade in commodities between Canada and Japan goes, six sogo shosha set up branches and offices there in the 1950's.
In the 1960's four other sogo shosha estab lished their independent Canadian trading sub sidiaries; Marubeni in 1960 , Sumitomo in 1961 , Mitsubishi in 1965 and C. Itoh in 1969 . The locations of their headquarters were in Toronto (Marubeni), Vancouver (Sumitomo23) and Mitsu bishi) and Montreal (C. Itoh) (Figure lb) . With the establishment of the Canadian trading sub sidiaries, the branches and offices which for merly belonged to either parent companies or American subsidiaries were reassigned to the newly established ones.
In 1965 Mitsui opened an office in Edmonton to engage in the energy-related business24). Edmonton is the capital of Alberta and one of the fastest growing cities since 1941 because of the expansion of the oil industry.
The 1970's saw the completion of the estab lishment of Canadian trading subsidiaries. After the merger of Kanematsu and Gosho in 1967, Kanematsu Canada, then Kanematsu Gosho Canada, was founded in 1972 with its headquarters in Montreal. Only two years later the head office was moved to Toronto. In 1974 Tomen Canada and Nichimen Canada were cre ated. Tomen placed its head office in Toronto while Nichimen25) located in Montreal ( Figure  lc) . Note that Nichimen was developed from a cotton trader, and thus its strength resided in the textiles, as well.
An outstanding development in the 1970's was the expansion of offices in Calgary ( Figure  lc) . Calgary is the second largest city in Alberta and a booming city due to the burgeoning pe troleum industry , which attracted sogo shosha particularly after the oil crises. In 1972 Mitsui moved its office from Edmonton to Calgary, while in 1974 Nissho Iwai opened up its Edmon ton office.
A Halifax office was opened by Marubeni in 1972 and closed shortly thereafter in 1977. The major function of this office was to export Ca nadian fish such as herring, smelt and squid to Japan26). Marubeni was distinguished from other trading companies by being financially involved in some packing firms that canned salmon and trout in Canada (KURIHARA, 1986, pp. 372-373) . Later the company withdrew from marine products-related ventures since buying processed fish in the markets was profit able enough27).
The 1980's saw the relocations of headquar ters (Figure id) . C. Itoh moved its head office from Montreal to Calgary in 1981, then to Van couver in 198328). Tomen shifted its head office from Toronto to Vancouver in 1982. The head quarters of these two companies remain in Van couver at present.
In contrast, three companies, Nissho Iwai, Nichimen and Mitsubishi, ultimately moved their head offices to Toronto. Nissho Iwai relo cated its head office from Toronto to Vancouver in 1983, since the company was involved in prospective energy projects, especially the ill fated LNG development in Alberta. With a shift of interest from natural resources to manufac turing related business, the company moved its head office back to Toronto in 1988. In 1983 Nichimen relocated its head office from Montre al to Toronto. The present Montreal office belongs to the jurisdiction of Nichimen Ameri ca.
Mitsubishi took two steps to move its head office. First, the company moved its president and chief executive officer from Vancouver to Toronto, while retaining the registered corpo rate head office and Chairman of the Board of Directors in Vancouver (KURIHARA, 1986, p. 368) . Then Mitsubishi designated Toronto as an official head office in 1986. According to the Chairman, Mitsubishi is already strong in west ern Canada so the company has had to strengthen its business in the East29).
A new development in the 1980's was the opening of an office in Whitby near Toronto by Nissho Iwai in 1987. Only a year later the office was moved to Ingersoll, where the forenamed CAMI plant is located. This decision was also motivated by Nissho Iwai's desire to be engaged in manufacturing related business in southern Ontario.
As recently as in 1990 Sumitomo moved its headquarters from Vancouver to Toronto. At present seven out of nine sogo shosha have their head offices in Toronto, while the rest are in Vancouver (Figure 1e ).
The movement of head offices from Vancou ver to Toronto in the 1980's and 1990's may be attributed to a number of social, economic and political factors. By 1981 Toronto had became the largest urban center in Canada, surpassing Montreal. During the 1970's the acceleration of the drive for protection of the French-language in Quebec encouraged the exodus of many Eng lish-speaking Quebecers. The Parti Quebecois, which won the 1976 provincial election, passed language legislation establishing French as the province's sole official language. As a result, many English-speaking residents left Montreal, and anglophone companies relocated to Toron to. Thus, these political, social and cultural pres sures explain why Montreal has fallen behind Toronto.
In addition to the influx of people from Quebec, Toronto attracts a considerable number of immigrants from abroad and mi grants from other provinces (SIMMONS and BOURNE, 1989, pp. 34-35) . It has become the dominant metropolis by creating the largest market in the country.
Toronto's strategic location in industrial southern Ontario has also contributed to its growth. The Industrial Heartland of Canada (YEATES,1987, pp. 109-147) overlaps the metro politan corridor stretching from Windsor to Quebec City. Since Toronto is surrounded by numerous other industrial centers, its industrial power is unmatched elsewhere in Canada.
Measured by the degree of control exercised by Canadian and foreign corporations located in Toronto and Montreal, the two largest metro politan centers are the leaders in the four major sectors of finance, manufacturing, services and resources in the Canadian economy. "Toronto is at the apex of the Canadian urban industrial hierarchy, and Montreal is clearly second" (DRIEDGER, 1991, p. 175) .
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1988 has reinforced this trend. As previously mentioned, since some Japanese manufacturers were afraid of being excluded from the newly established market, they set up their plants in the Industrial Heartland. Sogo shosha have also been drawn to Toronto, for the greater number of business opportunities in this area .
The province of Quebec's language policy, the existence of the largest market, the strate gic location of the Industrial Heartland, the locus of large corporations and the Free Trade Agreement, have all contributed to the suprem acy of Toronto in the Canadian urban industri al hierarchy. The relocation of sogo shosha headquarters to Toronto in the 1980' s and 1990's is an indicator of the growth of this metropolitan center. Figure 1e summarizes the distribution of sogo shosha offices in Canada in the 1990's. Toronto has seven headquarters and two branches; Van couver two headquarters, six branches and one office; Montreal four branches and five offices; Calgary one branch and five offices; and Inger soll one branch. Based on the number and the size of sogo shosha offices, Toronto is the most significant, and Vancouver is second . Montreal is ranked third followed by Calgary which is Japanese direct foreign investment in Canada has been relatively moderate in size, but is still significant in its impact. In fact, the 1980's saw the rapid increase in investment and the diver sification of investment sectors. Since mature Japanese manufacturers, financial institutions and real estate companies were the major con tributors to this trend, the proportion of sogo shosha investment in the total Japanese invest ment in Canada has declined relatively. Geo graphically, British Columbia and Ontario have been the two leading host provinces of Japa nese DFI. During the 1980's Ontario attracted further Japanese investment.
The expansion and diversification of Japanese DFI in Canada for the last decade were attributed to the changes in investment climate of the host coun try and the appreciation of the yen.
Sogo shosha, or the nine largest Japanese gen eral trading companies, have been the chief promoters of Japanese trade and major vehicles for bringing in Japanese overseas investment during the postwar period. Their organizational and functional characteristics enable sogo shosha to play a crucial role in organizing and coordinating overseas projects.
In Canada sogo shosha have been engaged in various investments.
The most important in vestment is in commerce, through the establish ment of their trading subsidiaries and market ing companies. The troika scheme has been adopted in manufacturing joint ventures. Par ticipation in natural resource development proj ects comes along with minority equity shares and long-term purchasing contracts. Hence, the three principal types of sogo shosha investment are trade-oriented and uniquely archetypical Japanese DFI. Despite their relatively small amount of investment, the leverage is enor mous, since sogo shosha have been involved in many joint ventures with minority equity shares. Sogo shosha investment is a catalyst to draw other Japanese investment into Canada.
The postwar presence of sogo shosha in Canada has been traced back to 1954. Eventual ly, all nine sogo shosha have set up their wholly owned trading subsidiaries. The Canadian trad ing subsidiaries, however, are often subject to their American counterparts, due to the small size of the Canadian market, the location of its major market and high dependency on Ameri can DFI.
Their economic activities are also reflected in the location of sogo shosha offices. Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver have been the loci of sogo shosha offices since the 1950's, and Calgary since the 1970's. These locational preferences are attributed to a number of factors: the func tions and size of a city, the proximity to domes tic and Japanese markets, the locale of the In dustrial Heartland, federal and provincial gov ernment policies, and companies' strategies. In particular, the relocation of sogo shosha head quarters to Toronto in the 1980's and 1990's confirms Toronto's position at the top of the Canadian urban industrial hierarchy. The pref erence for Vancouver over Montreal is a signifi cant feature of the Japanese trading companies. 1992 . However, it has had little effect on the matters discussed in this paper. 4) In the 1980 amendment, the authorization of Japanese overseas investment changed from ap proval by the Ministry of Finance to prior decla ration to the Ministry. 5) Hereafter, the dollar indicates the U.S. dollar, unless otherwise specified. 6) The Japanese government data are given for the fiscal year which starts in April and ends in the following March. 7) Although most projects are recorded by their location, a few that involve several locations are recorded by the main site of investment or by the corporate head office. 8) There are two important qualifications. First, total assets of all foreign banks are limited to 8% of the total domestic assets of all banks in Canada. Second, each foreign bank must limit its assets in Canada to 20 times its deemed capital base (WRIGHT, 1984, p. 66 ). 9) See KURIHARA (1990) for a detailed discussion on the Canadian investment climate as compared with the American one. Also see KURIHARA (1991) for changes in the economic and political environment in Canada and Japan. 10) The aggregate data of Shukan Toyo Keizai can not be directly compared with the Japanese gov ernment data, because the latter include both planned, yet unmaterialized projects and already withdrawn projects. 11) In this paper, all those offices which are smaller than branch offices in terms of staff numbers are classified as offices. Thus, they include represent ative offices, local offices and detached offices. In addition, branches often keep their own ac counts. 12) By the occupation General Headquarters order 
